Abstract-The Internet Autonomous System (AS) topology has important implications on end-to-end routing, network economics and security. Despite the significance of the AS topology research, it has not been possible to collect a complete map of the AS interconnections due to the difficulties involved in discovering peering links. The problem of topology incompleteness is amplified by the increasing popularity of Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) and the "flattening" AS hierarchy. A recent study discovered that the number of missing peering links at a single IXP is larger than the total number of the observable peering links. As a result a large body of research focuses on measurement techniques that can alleviate the incompleteness problem. Most of these proposals require the deployment of additional BGP vantage points and traceroute monitors. In this paper we propose a new measurement methodology for improving the discovery of missing peering links through the publicly available BGP data. Our approach utilizes the traffic engineering BGP Communities used by IXPs' Route Servers to implement multi-lateral peering agreements. We are able to discover 36K additional p2p links from 11 large IXPs. The discovered links are not only invisible in previous BGP-based AS topology collections, but also 97% of those links are invisible to traceroute data from CAIDA's Ark and DIMES projects for June 2012. The advantages of the proposed technique are threefold. First, it provides a new source of previously invisible p2p links. Second, it does not require changes in the existing measurement infrastructure. Finally, it offers a new source of policy data regarding multilateral peering links at IXPs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet inter-domain routing infrastructure is composed by self-organized networks of routers called Autonomous System (AS). The de-facto protocol for inter-domain routing is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), and it is probably the most critical piece of the Internet infrastructure that glues the whole Internet together. The AS topology has important implications on the performance, security and quality-of-service of overlay protocols and applications, and has therefore attracted significant research interest from a variety of disciplines. In the last two decades there has been a great effort in collecting and studying the Internet topology at the AS level. A number of topology datasets were collected, various topological properties were discovered and a number of network models were proposed [1] , [2] , [3] .
Despite the extensive research, many of the findings have been characterized as controversial due to the widely documented incompleteness of the existing topology datasets [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] . The most widely-used methodologies for compiling the AS graph utilize either public BGP feeds or traceroute monitors. The incompleteness problem emanates mainly from the inability of those data sources to capture a number of peer-to-peer AS links due to the restrictions imposed on their propagation. The incompleteness problem is amplified by the increasing popularity of the Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) as a paradigm for the establishment of peering interconnections. Two recent studies on IXP peerings provided evidence that the amount of missing links may lie in a range from 50% to more than 100% of the visible AS links based on public BGP and traceroute data [10] , [11] . To address this problem a number measurements methodologies have been proposed or deployed. These proposals include new approaches for the placement of the BGP vantage points [12] , [13] , [14] , aggressive deployment of traceroute monitors at the edge of the network through crowd-sourcing [8] , [15] , and the combination of different data sources including Internet Routing Registries (IRRs) and looking glass servers [16] , [17] , [18] , [10] .
In this paper we propose a new measurement methodology to improve the discovery of invisible AS peerings from publicly available BGP data. Our approach is based on inferring IXP peerings over Route Servers which are used to implement multilateral peerings. The default behavior of Route Servers is to advertise everything they learn to all the connected networks, but many IXPs allow its members to control how their prefixes are advertised by using a set of special-purpose BGP Community values. We implement an algorithm to mine these Community values and extract the Route Server participants and their export policies for 11 IXPs. By combining these data we are able to infer more than 36K peer-to-peer links which are not visible in the BGP AS paths. We exhibit the correctness of the inferred links by evaluating them against connectivity information obtained through hundreds of traceroute and looking glass servers.
The proposed link discovery methodology has three advantages: (i) It unveils a large number of hidden IXP peer-to-peer links that are not visible to other available topology datasets. IRR records do not register the peerings with the Route Server members but only with the Route Server. Moreover, only 1062 of the discovered links are included in the topology information obtained from CAIDA's Ark and DIMES. Therefore, our methodology is complementary and not overlapping to 2 the other sources of AS topology information. (ii) It works on the existing sources of BGP data (i.e. RouteViews, RIPE RIS, PCH) and it can be easily reproduced without requiring the deployment of additional equipment. Moreover, our approach can help to reduce the cost of active measurement methodologies dedicated in the discovery of IXP peering, or help in achieving better-targeted probing. (iii) In addition to link discover, our approach provides a new data source of IXP peering policies, and how IXP members select their peering partners in Multilateral Peering Agreements (MLPA).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the background and related works. Section III introduces our measurement methodology. Section IV presents our results and validation efforts. Finally, Section V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND A. Inter-domain Routing
A network of routers under the same administrative entity is called an Autonomous System (AS) and comprises a routing domain. Each AS is identified by a unique 32-bit number (ASN) and has been assigned with one or more IP address blocks (IP prefixes). The ASes are autonomous in the sense that they can independently decide which Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) will be used for routing inside their own domains. To achieve global reachability ASes should interconnect and exchange prefix reachability information among each other. The de-facto protocol for inter-domain routing today is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). In inter-domain routing connectivity does not imply reachability, which is fundamentally determined by the routing policies specified by the AS operators. These policies depend largely on the business relationships agreed by the ASes upon the establishment of their links. The AS business relationships define the economics of routing and have been coarsely divided into three categories. A customer-to-provider (c2p) relationship is established when an AS (customer) pays a better-connected AS (provider) to transit traffic to the rest of the Internet. A peer-to-peer (p2p) relationship is agreed when two ASes exchange traffic only between themselves and their customers to minimize the costs of sending traffic through their providers. Finally, a sibling relationship expresses the connection between ASes under the same organization, which can freely exchange traffic without cost or routing restrictions.
BGP routes are usually exported following the so-called valley-free rule [19] , i.e. a customer route can be exported to any neighbor, but a route from a peer or a provider can only be exported to customers. Hence, a path (a series of adjacent AS links) is valley-free if it complies with one of the following patterns (the sibling links can be found in any position of the path without changing the valley-free property): (1) n×c2p + m×p2c; or (2) n×c2p + p2p + m×p2c; where n and m ≥ 0. The valley-free rule describes a typical routing path that is valid for inter-domain routing. Most valid routing paths are valley-free because they comply with the business interest of ASes, i.e. to minimize operation cost and maximize revenue. It should be noted that the valley-free rule is not an enforcement rule. It is observed that a small number of routing paths do not follow this rule, either because of policy misconfigurations [20] , or due to the complexity of some AS relationships which is not captured by the simple customer/peer/sibling model [21] .
B. AS Topology Data Sources
The most widely used sources of AS topology data are the BGP Route Monitors, such as RouteViews, RIPE RIS, Packet Clearing House and the Abilene Observatory. These projects connect to a number of ASes and passively collect feeds of BGP table dumps and updates. Each table and update entry includes an AS Path attribute that corresponds to the list of ASes that should be traversed to reach an IP prefix. The AS path is the primary source of AS adjacencies and it is generally considered as a reliable source in terms of false positives. BGP misconfigurations or route hijacks may introduce artificial links that are usually filtered based on the lifetime of an AS path, assuming that such phenomena are short-lived [9] . Other sources of BGP data include Looking Glass (LG) servers that allow the remote execution of nonprivileged BGP commands through a web interface or remote login. In the general case LG servers do not allow full BGP table dumps, and typically they are used in one-off studies and not periodical data collection due to the high cost of performing prefix-specific queries.
A second popular source of topology information is the IPlevel paths collected through globally distributed traceroute monitors that actively probe a list of IP addresses. AS links can be obtained by mapping the collected IP addresses to ASNs. However, such mapping is non-trivial and can produce considerable artifacts [22] . Finally, the Internet Routing Registry (IRR) is a publicly accessible database where AS administrators voluntarily and manually register routing information. IRR data are frequently inaccurate, incomplete or intentionally false, although certain databases -notably RIPE -are significantly more reliable. It has been shown that with the proper filtering techniques IRR can provide a useful source of topology data [23] , [24] . More topology data sources exist (e.g. syslogs) but they are usually proprietary and not available to the research community.
C. The Topology Incompleteness Problem
The most significant limitation of the existing BGP collection projects is the large number of missing links. Missing links have been categorized to two types, hidden and invisible [25] . Hidden links are usually backup c2p links that can be observable by a set of BGP monitors if the preferred path towards a prefix changes. On the other hand, invisible links are impossible to be observed because of the number and placement of the BGP monitors. Invisible links are typically of p2p type and they cannot be observed due to the propagation restrictions of the valley-free rule. Invisible p2p links consist the majority of missing links, and are mostly located in the periphery of the AS graph [7] , [9] . BGP feeds are mostly provided by high-tier ASes, while some geographic areas are poorly covered. Even worse, many BGP feeders treat their connection with the monitors as a p2p link and they advertise only prefixes learned from their customers. Better placement of the BGP monitors can help towards mitigating the incompleteness problem [12] , [13] , [14] . However, BGP feeders participate voluntarily and some ASes may not wish to share their BGP data. Hence, it is difficult to engineer an optimal BGP route collection infrastructure.
The traceroute paths have similar problems with BGP measurements in terms of missing links, but it is considerably easier to deploy traceroute monitors even to personal computers. Highly distributed traceroute monitoring infrastructures [15] , [8] is a very promising approach to optimize the discovery of invisible AS links. While these efforts improve the accuracy of the collected AS topologies, it has not been possible yet to obtain a complete map.
A critical component of the AS ecosystem is the Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) substrate, that provides a physical infrastructure to facilitate connectivity. IXPs provide a costeffective peering platform, especially for small and mediumsized ASes that want to openly peer without having to establish multiple point-to-point links. There has been evidence that the discovery of p2p links in IXPs is the key towards obtaining complete AS connectivity maps [18] . This hypothesis has been confirmed by an Internet-wide traceroute study that specifically targeted the discovery of IXP peerings [10] . In total, about 58K IXP peering were discovered, of which almost 44K were not visible in any public dataset. Ager et.al. presented the most recent in-depth study of a large IXP using sFlow traffic data collected at the IXP's infrastructure [11] . Their analysis revealed that the peering fabric is much richer than previously estimated. In that IXP alone there were discovered 50K p2p links, about 10K more compared to the public BGP data of the same period.
Despite the novelty of the techniques presented in [10] , [18] for the discovery of IXP links, they have not been regularly repeated to provide periodical data. The main reason is the cost involved in conducting large-scale targeted traceroute measurements in terms of time and number of queries. Also, the use of looking glass servers is highly constrained and not appropriate for being used as a regular measurement platform [26] , while sFlow data used in [11] are private and normally not available to the broader research community. From the analysis in section II-C it can be understood that unearthing IXP links can be decisive towards obtaining complete AS topologies. At the same time, the cost of a measurement methodology should be kept low in order to allow the periodical execution of the measurements. Towards this direction this section presents a framework for discovering invisible IXP peering links through public BGP data. This is achieved by mining the connectivity and reachability data used to establish Multilateral Peering (MLP) agreements.
A. Multilateral Peering Agreements
An increasing number IXPs offer two interconnection paradigms, bi-lateral and multi-lateral peering. In bi-lateral agreements, for every peering a new BGP session should be established. This approach has scalability problems in the case of large IXPs where most of the participants have an open peering policy and wish to maximize their peering connections. Indeed, in [11] it was reported that more than 50K peerings were established in a single IXP due to the dense connectivity among tier-2 and leaf ASes. Managing a separate BGP session for each peer router can involve considerable overhead. MLP offers a scalable way to support dense peering interconnections. Instead of establishing direct BGP sessions among them, MLP participants connect with one or more Route Servers (Figure 1) . A Route Server reflects the BGP routes learned from one participant to all the other participants, without changing the BGP attributes and without forwarding any traffic. Peerings over a Route Server can happen even if the traffic requirements are not met, because traffic is aggregated from multiple peers. For example, Google's peering policy requires at least 100Mbps peak traffic to establish a bi-lateral peering, but networks with less than 100Mbps traffic are invited to peer in any European IXP Route Server [27] . Although connection to Route Servers is not mandatory, usually a large percentage of IXPs' participants opt in. For instance, AMS-IX reports that about 77% of its participants also connect to its Route Servers.
BGP routes sent to a Route Server are by default advertised to all the connected networks. However, Route Server participants can apply inbound and outbound filtering to control which networks receive their routes. Such filtering mechanisms are essential for IXP participants because even ASes with very open routing policy may not wish to peer with everybody. There are several techniques to implement policy filters, but the most popular practice is through the use of Communities, 16th IEEE Global Internet Symposium Control of route advertisements in a Route Server using BGP Communities an optional 32-bit BGP attribute used to encode additional information on a BGP route [28] . The values of BGP Communities are not standardized, but the majority of IXPs follow a common format presented in Table I .
To better understand how these Communities are used to control the announcement of routes consider the example presented in figure 2 for a Route Server with rs-asn 8714. When a path is advertised with the Communities 0:8714 8714:8359 8714:8447, the Route Server will advertise this route only to AS8359 and AS8447. If the Communities 8714:8714 0:8342 0:8732 are applied on a BGP path, the Route Server will advertise it to all the connected networks except AS8342 and AS8732. Note that the applied Communities are either Open + Exclude, or Restrictive + Include.
Therefore, two ASes can have a peering over a Route Server if two requirements are satisfied. First, connectivity which is enabled by establishing a session with the Route Server. Second, reachability which is enabled by configuring the appropriate outbound filters using BGP Communities (when Communities are used for advertisement control) and inbound AS-PATH filters.
B. Discovering MLP Links
The key towards discovering MLP peerings is to find the BGP Communities used for advertisement control in Route Servers (RS Communities). The BGP Communities is a transitive attribute that can be propagated along an AS path. If at least one Route Server participant (or one of its customers) provides a BGP feed to a route collector, it is possible to obtain the RS Communities for a number of IXP participants and infer a large number of missing links.
Before we explain in detail the algorithm, consider the example illustrated in Figure 3 . Assume that A, B, C and D are four ASes connected to the same IXP Route Server (among other ASes). Also, assume that these four ASes have a mesh connectivity over the Route Server. If A peers with a BGP route collector it will advertise the paths learned from B, C and D which are the visible p2p links. The links that do not involve A will be invisible. Although we know that B, C and D connect to the same Route Server, we do not know if they peer or not. However, these paths will be accompanied by the RS Communities that B, C and D have applied and provide the reachability information. By processing these RS Communities we can infer that B asks the Route Server to advertise its routes to A, C and D, while D allows its routes to be advertised to any peer connected to the Route Server except X and Y. By combining these data we can infer the existence of a p2p link between B and D, since both the connectivity and reachability requirements are met. Even if we have only one BGP feeder from an IXP, if this feeder is densely connected we can obtain the RS Communities for a large number of a Route Server's participants.
To implement the above algorithm we need the list of participants in IXPs' Route Servers. We obtain this list either directly through the websites of the IXPs or from PeeringDB, a database for the sharing of peering information [29] . These sources have been found to be reliable and up-to-date [18] .
Based on the above intuition, we discover the missing links according to the following algorithm:
Step 1: For every BGP record we parse the Communities attribute to extract the values that indicate Route Server policies. We determine the IXP based on the first 16 bits of those Community values that encode the ASN of the Route Server.
Step 2: When a set of RS Communities has been identified, we parse the AS path to pin-point the AS that applied these Communities (Setter). We check every AS in the path against the list of the IXP's participants. We distinguish the following cases: 1) If the AS path contains less than two IXP participants we cannot pin-point the Setter. 2) If the AS path contains two IXP participants, we identify as the Setter the AS closer to the IP prefix. 3) If the AS path contains more than two IXP participants, we need to determine which two have a p2p relationship (normally only one p2p relationship should be observed in an AS path, as explained in II-A). For this purpose we use the AS relationships from [30] which have been shown to be the most accurate. After we find the IXP participants with the p2p relationship, we identify as Setter the AS whose position in the path is closer to the prefix.
Step 3: For the Setter AS we construct a list A containing the Route Server participants to which its routes are advertised. We have two cases depending on the type of the RS 16th IEEE Global Internet Symposium For some Route Servers the "advertise to all" BGP Community has essentially no effect since this is the default operation. When implementing an open peering policy the rs-asn:rs-asn Community may be omitted. Instead, the RS Communities may contain only an array of Exclude values of type 0:peer-asn which makes it difficult to determine the IXP as described in step 1. In such cases we determine the IXP by examining the the excluded ASes. Each of the excluded ASes can participate in many IXPs, but their crossexamination can help us nail-down the candidate IXPs to only one. Figure 4 illustrates this approach. Due to the limited space, we only describe the major steps in our algorithm. A more detailed description and analysis can be found in [31] , along with source code implementation.
IV. RESULTS AND VALIDATION
We accumulate daily BGP table dumps and update messages from the RouteViews and RIPE RIS Repositories from 1 -30 June 2012. We filter out (1) the reserved and private AS numbers (i.e. 23456 and 56320 -65535) that should not appear in normal BGP advertisements and (2) path cycles that result from misconfiguration. Misconfigurations can also happen in setting the Community values. Typically such errors are transient and to avoid them we use only paths that appear for 7 consecutive days or more. We also collect BGP Communities data for 11 large IXP Route Servers from their websites or their IRR records. Table II presents the results of our algorithm. The IXP Feeders column corresponds to the ASes A of Figure 3 . If a link exists in more than one IXPs it is reported only once for the larger IXP. In total we discover 35,675 invisible p2p links among 512 IXP participants. To put this number in context, for the same period there were 49,600 visible peering links to all the RouteViews and RIPE collectors while the number of total AS links was 128,368. Hence, our methodology revealed -CIX  50  132  7127  LINX  47  120  5856  AMS-IX  47  110  4912  France-IX  11  101  4544  MSK-IX  11  43  722  ECIX  5  38  572  LONAP  4  33  419  STHIX  3  26  290  SFINX  7  21  188  TOP-IX  7  21  175 73% additional peering links and 28% additional links in total. Interestingly, almost all the discovered p2p links are also invisible to the existing public sources of traceroute topology data, CAIDA's Ark and DIMES. Only 3% of the discovered links can be also obtained from these datasets. As explained in [10] these projects are not designed to discover peering links, thus they can miss a large number of IXP peerings.
A. Validation
To validate our link discovery framework we test the agreement of our dataset with connectivity information extracted from public LG servers. By querying the PeeringDB database we collected the address of 477 LG servers of which 152 are relevant to the discovered links. Relevant here means that the LG offers an interface to the collectors of a RS Communities Setter, or one of its customers. For every discovered link relevant to a particular LG server we examine its existence by querying the LG with the command show ip bgp [prefix] that outputs the contents of the BGP table for the specified IP prefix. We use four to six different prefixes to ensure that path diversity due to traffic engineering techniques will not cause our validation to miss existing links. In total we tested 4K randomly selected links, and for 94.3% of those we were able to validate their existence. The links that could not be validated does not mean that do not exist. Some LG servers have sessions with route collectors that are geographically distant from the IXP link we want to validate. Even if the IXP link exists it may only serve local traffic and for this reason be hidden from a distant route collector. Moreover, LG servers will display only the best path and some links may be hidden at the moment we queried the LG. The fact that 94.3% of the evaluated links were visible to the LGs means that the majority of the discovered links are used as primary connection for at least one prefix. We plan to extend our validation by employing additional connectivity information sources, such as the use of peering matrices as in [32] .
B. Limitations
Although we discover a large number of missing links our methodology is not a complete solution to the incompleteness problem. From the results in Table II we can see that for DE-CIX we discovered about 7K links while it is known that more 16th IEEE Global Internet Symposium than 50K links exists [11] 1 . However there is no single source of topological data that can provide a complete topology. Another limitation is that not all IXPs use a Community-based route filtering or may strip out the RS Communities. The effort for improving the accuracy of AS connectivity should rely on a combination of measurement methodologies and our study contributes towards this direction.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a new methodology for the discovery of invisible IXP p2p links. We focus on multilateral peering agreements established over IXP Route Servers, because the nature of these interconnections make possible their discovery through public BGP data. The proposed methodology is easily implemented and can be executed as often as required. In total we are able to discover 36K peering links which correspond to 73% additional peering links to those currently visible in the AS Paths of the public BGP data. More importantly, the majority of these links is not visible to IRR and the public traceroute datasets. Thus there is little overlap between our measurement methodology and the other existing sources of data. We validated the correctness of our methodology using 152 public BGP Looking Glass servers.
More than 94% of the tested links were successfully validated. As part of our future work we plan to combine more BGP sources to improve the discovery of missing links and extend our validation efforts.
